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Abstract
Causal selection has to do with the distinction we make between background conditions
and “the” true cause or causes of some outcome of interest. A longstanding consensus
in philosophy views causal selection as lacking any objective rationale and as guided,
instead, by arbitrary, pragmatic, and non-scientific considerations. I argue against this
position in the context of causal selection for disease traits. In this domain, causes
are selected on the basis of the type of causal control they exhibit over a disease of
interest. My analysis clarifies the principled rationale that guides this selection and how
it involves both pragmatic and objective considerations, which have been overlooked
in the extant literature.
1 Introduction. Causal selection has to do with the distinction we make between
background conditions and “the” true cause or causes of some outcome of interest. We
claim that “the” cause of a match lighting was the fact that it was struck, but not the
presence of oxygen. A car crash may involve many causal factors–ice on the road, the
speed of the car, the gas in the tank, and so on–but we are likely to explain it by citing
few of these. In each case, just a small number of factors are selected as causes of the
outcome, while most others are backgrounded. A longstanding consensus in philoso-
phy views causal selection as lacking any objective rationale and as guided, instead,
by arbitrary, pragmatic, and non-scientific considerations. This position is famously
supported by John Stuart Mill, whose arguments have “won the field” and remain
“echoed by contemporary authors” (Schaffer 2014). According to Mill, “Nothing can
better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause
of a phenomenon and its conditions, than the capricious manner in which we select
from among the conditions that which we choose to denominate the cause” (Mill 1874,
238). Lewis (1973) agrees with this, claiming that we select causes because they are
under our control, because we find them good or bad, or just because we want to talk
about them. He states, “We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some
event and call it ‘the’ cause, as if there were no others. Or we single out a few as the
‘causes,’ calling the rest mere ‘causal factors’ or ‘causal conditions’... I have nothing
to say about these principles of invidious discrimination” (Lewis 1973, 558-559).
This position faces significant problems in the context of biomedicine, where sci-
entists commonly identify “the” cause or causes of specific diseases. Scientists claim
that the cause of scurvy is vitamin C deficiency, that the cause of tuberculosis is the
tubercle bacterium, and that the cause of Huntington’s disease is a mutation in the
huntingtin gene. There is widespread consensus on the selection of these causes in
the medical community. Furthermore, at first glance, these causes appear importantly
relevant to their respective diseases in ways linked to possibilities of control. Targeting
these causal factors has allowed for successful prevention and treatment of disease, to
the extent of drastically reducing the incidence of some diseases and nearly eradicating
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others from the human population. If causal selection is arbitrary, why is there such
widespread consensus on the selection of causes for some disease traits? What explains
the apparent success of this selection in identifying factors that reliably allow for con-
trol over disease? Finally, if causal selection is unscientific, why do we view disease
explanation as a scientific matter? These points identify significant problems for the
mainstream philosophical position on causal selection and its ability to account for the
selection of disease causes in biomedicine.
In this paper I argue that the rationale behind causal selection for disease is best
understood in terms of the causal control that selected causes have over the disease of
interest. I provide a novel account of the types of control that guide this process. In this
domain, causes are selected on the basis of having (i) specific, (ii) probable, and (iii)
stable control over disease. I suggest that this selection is pragmatic in the sense that it
is relative to a practical goal–the goal of control. This goal is practical in the sense that
it is useful, in general, for our navigation and operation within the world and, more
specifically, for our practical aims of treating and preventing disease in patients. This
is a different notion of “pragmatic” than is often found in the philosophical literature,
where it is used to refer to considerations that are arbitrary, subjective and/or audience-
relative (Achinstein 1984; Schaffer 2014). Furthermore, I suggest that causal selection
for disease is also “objective” in the sense that once the goal of control is specified,
their are objective facts and considerations about what means conduce to this goal.
This paper provides an analysis of causal selection that clarifies these considerations.
I characterize causal selection as involving three main steps. The first step involves
setting a contrastive focus, while the second and third steps involve selecting causes
with respect to this focus. In order for a factor to be selected as “the” cause or one of
“the” causes of an effect, it must pass both the second and third steps. Once the (1)
contrastive focus is set, the remaining two steps involve selecting causes on the basis
of the causal control they have over this focus. The second step involves (2) assessing
whether a factor has any control over the effect of interest, and the third step involves
(3) assessing what type of control the factor has over the effect. I clarify three types
of control that guide this third and final selection step, which include control that is
(i) specific, (ii) probable, and (iii) stable for the disease of interest. It makes sense
that we select causes on these grounds, because they meet particular standards we
have for disease explanation and they provide valuable targets for disease treatment
and prevention. An important feature of my analysis is that it clarifies how unique
features of disease traits make causal selection for disease much different, and arguably
much easier, than causal selection for many other types of phenomena. One reason for
this, is that scientists often impose constraints on what qualifies as a “legitimate” or
“valid” disease category, where these constraints alone significantly narrow the number
of candidate causes for any given disease. Differences between disease examples and
the examples commonly examined in the philosophical literature on causal selection
can help clarify why mainstream philosophical views have overlooked the principled
rationale that guides causal selection for disease.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses important features of disease
traits and how they set the relevant contrastive focus. With this contrastive focus
specified, I provide a minimal criterion for causal control that captures the second step
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of causal selection. This criterion draws on Woodward’s (2003) interventionist account
of causation and it identifies “interventionist causes” for the contrastive focus. Section
3 examines the third and final selection step, where particular factors are selected from
a pool of candidate causes. I clarify the types of control that guide the selection of
causes in this final step. Throughout this analysis I clarify how causal selection for
disease is influenced by both pragmatic and objective considerations and I return to
this topic in the the concluding section.
2 Disease traits and interventionist causes. Human diseases are a unique type
of biological phenomenon. Modern medicine aims to define disease traits causally, in
terms of particular causal etiologies. While there is a sense in which all diseases are
produced by a multitude of causal factors, often very few factors are selected as “the”
cause or one of “the” causes of any given disease. For “monocausal” diseases we cite
single factors, as in the cases of scurvy, tuberculosis, and Huntington’s disease. For
other diseases we cite longer lists of causes. For example phenylkentouria (PKU) is
explained by appealing to both a gene mutation and a dietary factor.1 When little is
known about the causal etiology of a clinically accepted disease category–as is common
with psychiatric and other disorders–the “legitimacy” and “validity” of the disease is
often disputed or, at least, considered an open question.2 In this paper, I focus on
diseases for which we have some sufficiently understood causal etiology. These are the
cases where we commonly select disease causes and where there is consensus on this
selection.3
Human diseases, even those with well understood or simple causal etiologies, often
involve many symptoms. For example, although tuberculosis is explained by appealing
to a single bacterial factor, patients with this disease often present with a wide variety
of symptoms. These patients can exhibit symptoms that include: dry cough, blood-
tinged sputum, night sweats, weight loss, and fatigue, to name a few. Although we
distinguish among these symptoms we do not view them as individual diseases, but as
features of a single disease process. Additionally, symptomatic presentation can vary
significantly across patients with the same disease. Patients with the same disease may
present with completely different combinations of symptoms or with similar symptoms
that vary in degree. For an example of the former, one patient with tuberculosis may
exhibit of all the symptoms mentioned above, while another may present with only a
dry cough. In the case of the latter, two patients with tuberculosis may present with
a dry cough, but the severity of their cough may differ.
Tuberculosis has a relatively simple causal etiology in the sense that it is explained
1PKU is characterized by disordered metabolism of the amino acid phenylalanine, which results in impaired
neurological development. This disease is caused by both the ingestion of phenylalanine and a mutation in
the gene for the phenylalanine hydroxylase enzyme.
2The worry is not that the symptoms and signs of the disorder are not real (in the sense of being experienced or
exhibited by the patient), but that the disorder category will change with further clarification of the etiology
(Kincaid and Sullivan 2014). For more on this see Schaffner’s discussion of validity and etiopathological
validity in the context of psychiatry and general biomedicine (Schaffner 2012).
3If we know little about the causal etiology of a clinically accepted disease category, we typically do not
consider ourselves in a position to identify its causes.
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by appealing to a single causal factor. It also has a specific causal etiology, in the sense
that all cases of this disease have the same cause. What this reveals is that a disease
can have a simple and specific causal etiology, without this implying that it always
presents in patients with a single, uniform symptomotology. Unfortunately, the view
that particular diseases manifest in patients with uniform symptomology is common in
the philosophical literature.4 This view incorrectly posits uniform symptomology as a
kind of “standard” for medically accepted disease categories. If distinct diseases always
presented in such a uniform manner, diagnosis in the clinical setting would be much
easier and straightforward than it is. Instead, patients with the same disease often
present with highly divergent symptom profiles and clinicians are trained to diagnose
in light of this challenge.
While we do not expect most diseases to have simple causal etiologies, we often
assume that they have specific causal etiologies. In this sense, to say that disease D
has a specific causal etiology means that all instances of D are produced by roughly
the same causal factors.5 (I discuss this further in section 3). As the notion of specific
causal etiology pertains to many instances of a given disease–as opposed to a single or
token instance–it represents a type-level consideration. This type-level focus is present
in many of our claims about what “the” cause of a particular disease is. In this paper,
I focus on causal selection for type-level disease traits. This can be thought of as
causal selection that focuses on answering the following question: “What is the cause
of disease D in the human population?” When we answer this question we often focus
on the binary contrast of disease “absence” and “presence.” Of course, a patient either
has disease D or she does not–she cannot be in both of these states or in neither of
them. We expect disease causes to explain at least this contrast, in part because it
is often the ultimate contrast we want control over. If a causal factor only explains
positive degrees of disease pathology, without also explaining disease absence, we view
it an an incomplete and unsatisfying explanation. Our interest in completely curing
and preventing disease–i.e. ensuring the complete absence of disease–motivates our
interest in identifying causes of this binary contrast. If these causes also account for
varying states of a disease–in addition to disease absence–we view this as an added
advantage, but not a necessary criterion for the factors we select as disease causes.
The first step of causal selection involves setting a contrastive focus. So far, I have
identified two important features of disease traits that set this focus: disease traits
are (1) type level phenomena, which (2) are often represented as taking on the values
“present” or “absent.” In this paper, I argue that the rationale behind causal selection
for disease is best understood in terms of the causal control of factors over this con-
trastive focus. In the second step of causal selection, a factor is selected as a candidate
cause if it has some control, or some minimal amount of control, over this contrast.
What does it mean for a factor to have some causal control? Consider a minimal in-
4For examples of this, see: (Poland 2014; Blaxter 2015; Kincaid and Sullivan 2014; Murphy 2014).
5This is not the same as claiming that the causal factors in question only produce disease D and not other
diseases–this refers to the specificity of effects, given some cause. The notion of specific causal etiology
I discuss involves the specificity of causes given some effect (a particular disease). These two types of
specificity may be distinguished as (2.1) specificity of effect (given some cause) and (2.2) specificity of cause
(given some effect).
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terventionist criterion for causal control, which is met by factors I call “interventionist
causes” and inspired by Woodward (2003):
(i.c.) interventionist cause: a factor C has causal control over disease D if and
only if there are circumstances S such that if some (single) intervention that changes
the value of C (and no other variable) were to occur in S, then the value of D or the
probability distribution of D would change, for the contrastive focus in question.
The notion of an intervention ensures that when variable C is manipulated, it allows for
a change in the value of D in a way that excludes confounders or other variables that
may causally influence D. One advantage of the interventionist framework is its ability
to capture the motivation behind some of our experimental methods for identifying
causal relationships. If we want to determine whether substance X causes disease Y,
we might design an experiment in a model organism where we manipulate values of
X (and only X) to see if this causes a change in the occurrence of disease Y. In this
experiment, we are likely to keep potential confounding factors constant (e.g. diet,
exercise, etc.) in order to ensure that changes in X–and not changes in these other
factors–cause the outcome we measure.6 The interventionist criterion (i.c.) involves
a counterfactual claim: it maintains that C has causal control over D in the sense
that if there was a change in C, this would produce a change in D. This criterion
does not require that such an intervention on C is actually performed, in the sense of
being manipulated or even manipulable with current technology or by human means.
This makes sense of the fact that we view gene variants as the cause of many human
diseases, despite our inability to intervene on them in human patients. Technological
limitations and ethical restraint prevent us from manipulating these gene variants in
humans. However, we still maintain that some genes cause particular diseases, in the
counterfactual sense indicated: we mean that if such gene variants were manipulated,
this would change the disease status of the subject.7 We support this claim on the
basis of evidence acquired from various sources and not just from actually performing
the intervention in question. My analysis relies on a notion of causal control that is
counterfactual in the same sense.
In order for a factor to be selected as a disease cause, it must meet (i.c.) and
have some causal control over the contrastive focus. This is the second step and
the first “cut” of the causal selection process. Notice that the causes we select for
scurvy, tuberculosis, and Huntington’s disease all meet this interventionist criterion
(i.c.). Dietary vitamin C has causal control over scurvy in the sense that manipulating
levels of this dietary factor provides control over the occurrence and nonoccurrence of
6For more of these details, see (Woodward 2003).
7This highlights important differences between my position and Gannet’s (1999) analysis of pragmatic con-
siderations that influence genetic explanation. She views causal selection as guided by our success with
actual manipulation of candidate causes. I think her position neglects the importance of counterfactual (or
hypothetical) information in causal selection. Acknowledging the importance of this information helps ex-
plain why we cite genes and other factors as disease causes, despite our limitations in actually manipulating
them. Furthermore, Gannet and I both claim that causal selection in biology is pragmatic, but we disagree
about why. I suggest that causal selection is pragmatic in the sense that it relates to the practical goal of
control, as opposed to our ability to actually manipulate causal factors.
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the disease.
It might seem that the (i.c.) criterion is overly inclusive, in the sense that it picks
out a huge number of factors. Recall the car crash example, for which numerous factors
were identified as causally relevant. Lewis claims that the causes of the crash include:
the ice on the road, the blind corner, and even the birth of the driver’s paternal grand-
mother (Lewis 1986, 215-6). If all these factors meet the (i.c.) criterion, it might not
seem like a very helpful first cut. The ordinary life examples discussed in the philo-
sophical literature are different from disease examples, in a way that can misrepresent
causal selection in biomedicine. Disease traits are very narrow phenomena, both by our
choosing and for reasons that have to do with their manifestation in living organisms.
First, as we often define disease traits in terms of specific causal etiologies, our own
characterization of them significantly constrains their relevant causal factors from the
outset. (I discuss this more in section 3). Second, disease phenotypes are narrow in the
sense that their causes are expected to control the disease absence/presence contrast,
and only this contrast, in living human patients. This is a very narrow and fragile
contrast for a factor to have control over, in a way that is not characteristic of many
non-biological examples. If we want to prevent a match from lighting, or put it out
once lit, there are many ways to do this. We could chop the match into unrecognizable
pieces, pour corrosive chemicals on it, or throw it in the ocean. There are far fewer can-
didate causes for disease, because we expect such factors to have control over disease
traits without killing or harming the patient. We can destroy the match to prevent it
from lighting, but we do not want to destroy the patient to eliminate disease. There is
a sense is which there is no disease in a dead patient, but clearly this is not the type of
control that we want, or expect, disease causes to have. These features of disease traits
significantly reduce the number of candidate causes that we consider in our search for
“the” cause or causes of a given disease.
Once the contrastive focus of disease presence/absence is specified, the (i.c.) crite-
rion clarifies “objective” considerations that guide selection. Given the goal of control,
there are objective facts about which factors have control over this focus and which
factors do not. Consider the disease scurvy again, but now with regard to the candidate
causes “oxygen” and “dietary vitamin C.” “Oxygen” does not meet the (i.c.) crite-
rion for this disease, because manipulating oxygen does not allow for control over the
“absence” and “presence” of scurvy in living human patients. Of course, manipulating
oxygen in certain ways can kill a patient–this would happen if oxygen levels were set to
a very low value or if oxygen were completely removed from the patient’s environment.
Manipulating “oxygen” does have some control over whether a patient lives or dies,
but this is not the dominant contrastive focus for disease explanation. Instead, the
dominant focus is disease absence/presence in living patients. “Dietary vitamin C”
meets the (i.c.) criterion for this contrast in the case of scurvy, while “oxygen” does
not. This explains why we cite dietary vitamin C, and not oxygen, as “the” cause of
scurvy. However, while “oxygen” does not meet the (i.c.) criterion for scurvy there
is still a sense in which it is relevant or “necessary” for the incidence of this disease.
“Oxygen” is relevant to this disease in the sense that its presence is required for the
causal control that vitamin C levels have over scurvy. This is due to the fact that oxy-
gen is a requirement for human life and thus, it is required for attaining both values
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of the contrast in question. This clarifies how can we can view a factor like oxygen as
importantly relevant or necessary for disease, while still distinguishing it from factors
we select as “the” cause or causes of disease.
Thus, if a factor lacks causal control over the contrastive focus for a disease trait it
fails to pass the second causal selection step. This reveals part of the rationale behind
causal selection for disease traits and how the medical community can reach consensus
on “the” causes of some diseases. This consensus is partly explained by our expectation
that disease causes should have some causal control over the disease of interest. The
interventionist criterion (i.c.) captures this basic standard and the second step of the
causal selection process. In the next section I discuss the third step of this process,
where we select among candidate interventionist causes for a given disease.
3 Selecting among interventionist causes. In order for a factor to be selected
as “the” cause or one of “the” causes of a disease, meeting the interventionist criterion
(i.c.) is necessary, but not sufficient. Some factors meet (i.c.) for particular diseases
without being selected as “the” cause of the disease. For example, consider sleep
deprivation and the seasonal flu. Changing sleep duration, such that a patient is
sleep deprived, has some causal control over the flu in the sense that it can increase
susceptibility to infection by decreasing immune functioning (Bryant, Trinder, and
Curtis 2004). However, we do not consider sleep deprivation “the” cause (or even one
of “the” causes) of the seasonal flu. We reserve this designation for the particular flu
virus. What explains this selection of one interventionist cause over another? Notice
that targeting the flu virus (e.g. with vaccination8) provides a very different type of
control over the occurrence of the flu than does targeting patients’ amounts of sleep.
Targeting the virus provides (3.1) control over many to all cases of this particular
flu, (3.2) a high likelihood of preventing it in each case, and (3.3) control across a
wide variety of genetic and environmental conditions present in the patient population.
Compared to the flu virus, targeting levels of sleep significantly underperforms in all
of these areas. I discuss these three types of causal control–which I refer to as causal
control that is (3.1) specific, (3.2) probable, and (3.3) stable–and I clarify how they
guide our selection of disease causes.
3.1 Specific causes and causal control of broad scope. The factors we select
as disease causes exhibit very particular types of causal control over disease. The first
type of causal control I discuss relates to the assumption of specific causal etiology.
This assumption captures our default view that type-level disease traits have specific
causes. In other words, for a given disease D we often expect that most or all instances
of D are the result of a similar causal process. In the philosophical literature, the
notion of specific causal etiology for disease is often referred to as the “causal signature”
(Murphy 2014, 105), “disorder-specific pathophysiology” (Caspi and Moffitt 2006, 586),
or “shared causal process” (Zachar 2014, 87) for a disease trait. Sometimes we refer
to single factors as the specific causal etiology for a disease, like the huntingtin gene
mutation for Huntington’s disease. Other times we refer to multiple interacting factors
8This is the vaccine that is recommended annually, for everyone 6 months and older.
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as the specific causal etiology for a disease, like the gene variant and dietary factor for
the disease PKU. The important feature of specific causal etiology is not how many
factors cause an instance of disease D, but that the same factors produce all or most
instances of disease D.9
Just because we expect diseases to have specific causal etiologies, does not mean
that all clinically useful disease categories meet this standard. Sometimes we start
with clinically useful categories–like Parkinson’s disease–only to find out later, that
these categories fail to track specific causal processes. (This is unsurprising, because
we often create these categories before we have clear information about their causes.)
For example, our best evidence suggests that Parkinson’s disease has a non-specific
causal etiology, in the sense that (3.1.1) different combinations of causal factors cause
instances of the disease on different occasions. This contrasts with a situation of specific
causal etiology where (3.1.2) several factors interact to produce a disease, but where
every case of the disease is produced by the same interacting factors. An example of
(3.1.2) is PKU, because the same two interacting factors cause every instance of the
disease.
What does the assumption of specific causal etiology have to do with selecting
disease causes and causal control? This assumption clarifies our aim of selecting factors
that are specific for a disease, in part because these factors are likely to provide control
of broad scope over all or most instances of the disease in question. Consider the
situations above, where a disease D has either (3.1.1) a non-specific causal etiology or
(3.1.2) a specific causal etiology. One advantage of selecting specific causes is that they
can often be manipulated to control all or many cases of the population-wide disease
of interest. This is because, in situation (3.1.2), all cases of the disease are produced
by the same causal factors. Alternatively, if we select causes that are non-specific for
a disease, as in the case of (3.1.1), these factors are likely to have causal control of
narrow scope, in the sense that they influence a smaller percentage of the total cases of
disease D. This is because, in situation (3.1.1), different causal factors produce different
instances of the same disease D, so targeting the factors that produce any one instance
of the disease, is unlikely to provide control over the other instances that have different
causes. From the standpoint of treating and preventing disease, identifying factors
that are causally specific for particular disease traits is extremely valuable. It often
identifies factors that we can target to control and explain a large percentage of all
cases of a given disease in the population.
The notion of specific causal etiology plays a more complicated role in causal se-
lection than I have indicated so far. One complication is that this notion influences
both the factors we select as disease causes and those phenomena that we consider
to be “legitimate” diseases to begin with. If a disease category has no known causal
etiology, or if it has a non-specific causal etiology, the “legitimacy” of the category
and whether it represents a “true” disease are often called into question. This is help-
fully illustrated with Parkinson’s disease, which we understand as having a non-specific
9In this paper, I use a notion of specificity that refers to the number of cause and effect variables that
participate in a type-level causal relationship, as opposed to the values of these variables. The latter
(value) sense of specificity has received much more attention in philosophy of biology (Woodward 2010;
Waters 2007; Griffiths 2006). For more on this distinction, see (Woodward , Forthcoming).
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causal etiology. As mentioned above, current research suggests that different combina-
tions of causal factors produce different cases of Parkinson’s disease. Researchers view
this causal non-specificity as having “splintered the unitary conception of this disease”
and as “challenging traditional conceptual frameworks” for understanding Parkinson’s
disease (Shulman, De Jager, and Feany 2011, 214, 193). In this situation medical re-
searchers suggest either (1) continuing the search for some shared causal process (i.e.
some specific causal etiology) or (2) dividing up the disease category on the basis of
the distinct causal processes. Both of these options restore causal specificity by either
(1) finding it for the pre-established disease category or (2) creating it by redefining
the disease category. This reveals how causal specificity is both a guiding rationale
for causal selection and a standard that influences how we define disease traits. This
suggests that causal selection is more of a back-and-forth process than just a search
for causes given a fixed contrastive focus. We may start with a disease category and
search for its causes, only to redefine the category on the basis of what we find.
3.2 Probable causal control. A second type of causal control that guides causal
selection for disease is what I call probable causal control. This causal control refers
to the probability with which each outcome of the contrastive focus is produced when
selected factors are manipulated. Consider a light switch C, which can take the values
‘up’ or ‘down’ and a light E, which can take the values “on” or “off.” In the first case,
turning the switch “up” results in a 99% probability of the light bulb being “on” and
turning the switch “down” results in a 99% probability of the light bulb being “off.”
In a second scenario, turning the switch “up” has only a 60% probability of causing
the light to turn “on” and turning the light switch “down” only has a 60% probability
of turning the light “off.” In both cases the switches have some causal control over the
state of the light, but their control differs with regard to how probable each outcome
of the contrast is with interventions on the switch.10
When we select disease causes we prioritize factors that have a high degree of
probable causal control over disease. By targeting these factors, as opposed to factors
with less probable causal control, we increase the likelihood of getting a particular
outcome. This has a clear advantage for our treatment and prevention measures and
for explaining disease outcomes. If we want to control whether a light is “on” or “off” we
will prefer the first switch-bulb system to the second, because we are more likely to get
the outcome we want by manipulating the switch. In cases where we reach consensus
on disease causes, they often have probable causal control over the disease trait in
question. Consider diseases like scurvy, tuberculosis, and Huntington’s disease. In each
of these cases, when the disease cause is present (or properly introduced) in a patient,
her likelihood of acquiring the disease approaches 100%. Similarly, when the cause is
absent (or properly avoided) the likelihood of disease absence also approaches 100%.
A patient with the huntingtin gene mutation is almost certain to acquire Hungtinton’s
disease and very unlikely to get this disease without it (cases of this disease without
the mutation are unheard of). Alternatively, consider our attempts at causal selection
for schizophrenia, which is a psychiatric disorder associated with with a multitude of
10This notion of probable causal control shares similarities with the suggestion by Lu et al. that we look for
causes with high “power” (Lu, Yuille, Liljeholm, Cheng, and Holyoak 2008).
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causally relevant gene variants. In this case, no single variant (or set of variants) confers
a high probability of disease occurrence and nonoccurence, although some provide a
low probability of this sort. Failure to meet the standard of probable causal control
partly explains why the medical community does not view such variants as “the” cause
of this disease and why the search to better understand its etiology continues.
When a single causal factor provides a low degree of probable causal control over a
disease trait, we often search for interacting causes that increase this type of control.
Consider PKU again, which we explain by citing two causal factors: a gene variant
and a dietary factor. These are interacting causes for this disease, because they both
meet the (i.c.) criterion and they each influence the causal control that the other
has over the disease. The gene variant only causes PKU when the dietary factor is
present, and vice versa. One reason for selecting both of these causes in explaining
PKU is that together they provide more probable causal control over the disease than
a single factor alone. Of course, PKU is a relatively simple disease in the sense that we
explain it by citing only two interacting causes. One significant challenge associated
with disease explanation is that many diseases appear to be causally complex in the
sense that they have a multitude of interacting causes, which must all be accounted
for to provide a high degree of probable causal control over the disease. This can make
disease explanation and causal selection much more difficult, because a larger number
of causal factors have to be identified.
To say that causes with probable causal control are privileged in causal selection is
different from claiming that causation requires this type of control. Some probability-
raising accounts of causation support this later position, by maintaining that causes
are factors that result in a high probability of their effects.11 A well known objection to
these accounts cites the low probability of general paresis, or late state neurosyphillis,
among untreated patients with syphilis (Scriven 1959). Approximately one-third of
patients with untreated syphilis end up with general paresis, yet we still view the
syphilis bacterium as “the” cause of this low probability outcome. Probability-raising
accounts struggle to make sense of why we explain general paresis by citing the syphilis
bacterium, since the cause confers a low probability of the occurrence of the effect, com-
pared to a causal factor that approaches a 100% likelihood of producing an outcome.
My analysis clarifies this confusion and explains why this example is not problematic
for my position. First, we more often view general paresis as a set of symptoms pro-
duced by the disease syphilis, as opposed to a distinct disease itself. It is true that
we view the syphilis bacterium as the cause of general paresis, but we rarely expect
disease causes to have specific or probable causal control over disease symptoms. This
is because individual symptoms can be found in many different diseases (and thus, have
many different causes) and they can have variable presentation across cases of a partic-
ular disease (where there is, presumably, the same causal etiology).12 When we focus
on the proper disease target “syphilis,” we do identify the syphilis bacterium as “the”
cause of this disease. Our reasons for doing this include the facts that this bacterial
cause exhibits specific and probable causal control over the disease trait. Furthermore,
11Hempel’s inductive statistical (IS) account of explanation has been viewed as supporting this position
(Hempel 1965).
12I discuss these points in section 2.
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my analysis clarifies what features of causal relationships we privilege in some contexts,
but not what features of relationships make them causal. To say that factors with less
probable causal control are not privileged in causal selection is not to deny that they
are still causal relationships.
3.3 Stable causal control. A final type of causal control I discuss is causal control
that is stable. Stability is a feature of causal relationships that has been discussed
extensively by Woodward (2003, 2006, 2010). Recall that the interventionist criterion
(i.c.) refers to “circumstances S” in which a cause C has causal control over an effect
D. Stability refers to the extent to which the causal control of C over D holds in a
range of other circumstances Si, which differ from circumstances S (Woodward 2010).
Consider a broad set of conditions, which include the various genetic backgrounds
of the current human population and the range of environmental surroundings they
live in. If a cause C only has causal control over effect D in a very narrow range of
these circumstances, this causal control is unstable. An example of this would be a
situation where manipulating dietary vitamin C levels only controlled scurvy incidence
in people with a gene variant for brown hair, who also live in the state of Florida.13
In this case, the causal control of C over D only holds in patients with a narrow range
of genetic and environmental conditions, relative to all patients and environments in
the world. Alternatively, if C has causal control over D in a very broad range of these
circumstances, this causal control is considered stable. An example of this would be if
manipulating dietary vitamin C levels controlled scurvy incidence in patients of a wide
variety of genetic backgrounds, who live in many different environments. The second
situation of stable causal control is clearly more useful for the purposes of treatment
and prevention of disease–it allows for measures that have the potential to treat a larger
number of patients who live in many different types of environments. The causes we
select for scurvy and tuberculosis have stable causal control in the sense captured in
the second scenario. We can target these causes to treat and prevent these diseases in
patients with diverse genetic backgrounds, who live in a wide variety of environments.
There is an important complication involved in assessing the stability of causal
relationships. The degree to which a cause variable has stable (or unstable) causal
control depends on the range of circumstances Si that are considered. Clarifying exactly
how broad or narrow these circumstances are is difficult, because this determination
often seems context-dependent. This is acknowledged by Woodward, who states that
the range of circumstances that matter for assessing stabiliy are those that “do not
depart too much from the actual state of affairs or that do not seem too far-fetched or
that are not judged to be unimportant or irrelevant for subject-matter-specific reasons”
(Woodward 2006, 11).
What are the circumstances Si that matter for determining stability in the context
of disease traits? First, there is an important sense in which stability is relative to
particular reference classes, which group patients on the basis of factors like age group
and sex, depending on the disease of interest.14 For example, given a virus that causes
13This is not a true scenario. It is intended to clarify the relevant sense of unstable causal control.
14Boorse provides a helpful basic characterization of a reference class as “an age group of a sex of a
species”(Boorse 1977, 555).
11
cervical cancer, we do not assess the stability of this cause with respect to all patients,
but only with respect to patients of the female sex.15 The same can be said for pediatric,
geriatric, and other diseases, which are present in particular patient populations.16
When diseases are restricted to particular populations, we often assess the stability
of causal relationships with respect to this restriction. Second, as Woodward has
indicated, the circumstances that matter for assessing stability are those circumstances
that actually occur in the contexts we are interested in. In the context of disease, we
care about the range of conditions that are actually present in human patients and
their environments in the world. We care about these circumstances because they are
the circumstances in which we want to control disease. Whether a factor meets this
standard depends on the time-frame of interest. Future changes in our genetic make-up
and the environments we live in can alter the circumstances Si that we use in assessing
the stability of causal factors for disease. Third, we restrict the conditions included
in circumstances Si to those that include basic biological requirements for human life.
Just because there are some low oxygen environments on Earth, does not mean that
we assess the stability of disease causes with such circumstances in mind. All disease
causes break down in this type of environment, because it is incompatible with human
life. Since we cannot sustain human life in these circumstances, we are not focused on
controlling disease in them.
In cases where we identify “the” cause or causes of disease traits, these factors often
have control that is specific, probable, and stable, for the disease of interest. It makes
sense that we privilege these factors, because they provide types of control that serve
our interests in explaining, treating, and preventing disease. For a given disease trait,
targeting such factors is likely to provide (3.1) control over many to all instances of the
disease, (3.2) a high likelihood of preventing each instance, and (3.3) control across a
wide variety of genetic and environmental conditions that are present in the patient
population.
4 Conclusion. What does this analysis suggest about the role of “pragmatics”
in causal selection for disease traits? In the philosophical literature “pragmatic” is
commonly used to imply that something is arbitrary, subjective, or audience-relative.
Causal selection for disease does not appear to be “pragmatic” in any of these senses.
The significant consensus on causal selection for some disease traits and my analysis
of the principled rationale that guides this selection suggests that it is not simply an
arbitrary procedure. The factors we select as disease causes provide special types of
causal control that an arbitrary selection method would not explain. Furthermore,
it isn’t clear that subjective or audience-relative preferences, whatever they may be,
could capture the sense in which causal selection for disease is relative to a practical
goal, viz. the goal of control. Information relevant to control can provide us with
the means to change disease outcomes of real patients. It isn’t just a contrived way
of selecting causes that we want to talk about, that strike our fancy, or that we just
happen to view as important, without good reason. The factors we select as “the”
15The cervix is an organ that is present in females, but absent in males.
16Providing an account of reference classes and their role in stability assessments is outside the scope of this
paper.
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cause or causes of particular diseases often provide viable targets that we can use to
make a difference in the disease outcomes of real patients.
This suggests that causal selection for disease is pragmatic in the sense that it is
relative to the practical goal of control. Once the goal of control is specified, there
are objective facts and considerations about what means conduce to it. These consid-
erations include whether factors meet a minimal interventionist criterion (i.c.) in the
second step of causal selection, and whether factors provide (1) specific, (2) probable,
and/or (3) stable causal control in the third and final step of causal selection. These
may not be the exclusive types of control that guide this process, but they help to
clarify why we often single out few factors as “the” causes of particular diseases.
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